Effects of Change in Local Content Requirement and Exchange Rate Volatility in an International Oligopoly by 新海 哲哉 et al.
Effects of Change in Local Content Requirement
and Exchange Rate Volatility in an
International Oligopoly
page range 1-16
year 2018-05
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10236/00026849
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
  
Discussion paper No. 180 
 
Effects of Change in Local Content 
Requirement and Exchange Rate Volatility in 
an International Oligopoly 
 
Tetsuya Shinkai 
(School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) 
  
Takao Ohkawa 
 (Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University) 
  
Makoto Okamura 
(Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University) 
 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
E¤ects of Change in Local Content
Requirement and Exchange Rate Volatility in
an International Oligopoly
Tetsuya Shinkai
Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Hyogo, Japan
Takao Ohkaway
Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga, Japan
Makoto Okamuraz
Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan
May 4, 2018
1
Abstract
This paper investigates the changes in local content requirement
(LCR) and exchange rate volatility on an international oligopolistic
market in a foreign country that accepts n a¢ liates rms through FDI
from a home country. The subordinate rms are forced to procure a
proportion of their intermediate products from the foreign rms under
the LCR of the foreign government. We derive a Cournot equilibrium
of the oligopolistic foreign market, in which a¢ liate rms compete
with the foreign rms under foreign exchange rate uncertainty for
when the number of a¢ liates, n, is either exogenous or endogenous.
In the former case, we show the a¢ liates aggressively expand their
outputs and the ex-post expected prots of the a¢ liates decrease but
their ex-ante certainty equivalent of expected prots increases with
the volatility of the exchange rate when the relative risk aversion co-
e¢ cient is not high at equilibrium. In the latter case, we show LCR
tightening from the foreign government always accelerates the exit of
the a¢ liates from the foreign market and if the extent of the relative
risk aversion of the international rms is not high, the entry of a¢ li-
ates onto the foreign market can be urged as the risk of exchange rate
increases.
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1 Introduction
The bubble of the Japanese economy burst in the early 1990s and the popu-
lation has been aging and the birthrate declining rapidly thereafter. Conse-
quently, as the domestic markets for various products and services have been
shrinking in Japan, manufacturing companies in Japan have been seeking
to expand export sales to cover the shortage in their domestic sales. On
the other hand, globalization has progressed tremendously since the early
1990s. Competing in cost against their foreign rival manufacturers, Japanese
manufacturers have made foreign direct investments (FDI ).
The host foreign country accepting FDI often species that at least a
certain fraction of inputs must be bought on the local (host foreign) mar-
kets, that is, the local content requirement (LCR). Under LCR, Japanese
manufacturers that made FDI have to export the rest of their inputs to their
a¢ liates in the foreign country. They also have been remitted part of their
prots from their a¢ liates. As such, they have to face exchange rate un-
certainty. From the above, the rms in home country have to choose their
outputs on the foreign countrys market by using an ex-ante expectation of
the exchange rate, since they would export a portion of intermediate goods
to their a¢ liates and would receive a part of the remitted.
Here, we consider an international oligopoly model with the oligopolistic
market in a foreign country. The international home rms (IH rms here-
after) compete on a host foreign country (country 2) oligopolistic market
through their a¢ liates by FDI. Assume the government of country 2 imposes
LCR on a¢ liates (IF rms hereafter) of at least a  (0 <  < 1) proportion of
total inputs. Furthermore, we assume IF rm i internally reserves its prot
at the foreign market equilibrium at the ratio of s (0 < s < 1) and remits
its prot at the ratio of 1   s from the foreign market to the head o¢ ce
of its IH rm in the home country. We thus derive a Cournot equilibrium
under foreign exchange rate uncertainty for when the number of IH rms,
n, is either exogenous or endogenous. Then, we explore the e¤ects of foreign
exchange rate volatility and the change in the rate of LCR on equilibrium
outcomes.
2 Model
Assume there are two countries: country 1 (home country) and 2 (foreign
country). In country 1s oligopoly, the n international rms of country 1
compete on an oligopolistic market in a host foreign country (country 2)
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through their a¢ liate companies by FDI (IF rms) with m foreign rms (F
rms).
Each IH rm in home country 1 has a constant returns to scale technology
by cH  cIHi ; i = 1;    ; n, indicated by the home currency.
Where an international rm supplies its product on both a domestic mar-
ket and a foreign market, a domestic rm supplies its product only on a
domestic market. Although each IF rm procures its parts or intermediate
goods from the home country for products on the home country market, it
has to procure a  (0 <  < 1) proportion of its parts or intermediate goods
from a foreign country for the foreign market as per the LCR of the foreign
country government, and procures the rest of parts or intermediate goods
from the home country by imports. Each foreign rm supplies its product
on the foreign country market and procures all parts or intermediate goods
from foreign country 2. We only focus on the foreign countrys market com-
petition between IH and F rms, since IH rms choose their outputs for the
home country market independently of the outputs for the foreign countrys
market.
Foreign rms have constant returns to scale technology and their marginal
and average common cost is given by cF  cFj ; j = 1;   m, as indicated by
the foreign currency. Each IF rm incurs marginal cost ecIF to produce its
product in a a¢ liate company of the foreign country, which is a random
variable because it depends on the exchange rate between the home and the
foreign countrys currencies e, which is exogenous to the model. e is assumed
to be a log-normally distributed random variable, that is, e = exp( eX); eX s
N(; 2), and we assume that 2 > 1. The foreign Country government
stipulates that at least (0 <  < 1) of the total inputs have to be bought
from the local market and imposes import tari¤ of (0 <  < 1) per unit for
import inputs from the home country.
ecIF = (1 + )(1  )cH=e+ cF (1)
Then, it is well known that the mean and the variance of e are given by
e = exp(+ 2=2) (2)
and
2e = 2e(e2   1) > 2e for 2 > 1. (3)
We can easily derive
Ee [1=e] = exp( + 2=2) = e
e2
, (4)
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QF Pnj=1 qIFj +Pn+mj=n+1 qFj , (5)
pF = aF  Pni=1 qIFi  Pmj=1 qFj = aF  QIF  QF , (6)
As mentioned in the introduction, the a¢ liate of each IH rm remits a
(1  s) portion of its prot to the head o¢ ce of it in home country 1. There-
fore, the head o¢ ce is interested in the amounts of the expected remittance
from its a¢ liate. Hence, we can dene the amounts of remittance to the IH
rm head o¢ ce from its a¢ liate in foreign country 2 as
IHi  (1  s)e(pF   ecIF )qIFi
= (1  s)e(aF  Pni=1 qIFi  Pmj=1 qFj   ecIF )qIFi
= (1  s)e(aF  QF   (1 + )(1  )cH=e  cF )qIFi ; i = 1; :::; n. (7)
From (7 ), (6), and (5), the certainty equivalent of the expected prot of
IH rm i is given by
Ee CEIHi  = (1  s)Ee CEIFi 
= (1  s)fEe e(pF   ecIF )qIFi   SDe e(pF   ecIF )qIFi g
= (1  s)[afaF  QIF  QF   cFg
 (1  )(1 + )(1  )cH ]qIFi , (8)
where E() and SD() stand for expectation and standard deviation op-
erators, respectively, and
a = "   ,
where  is a relative risk averse coe¢ cient. The IH rm i chooses qIFi
to maximize the certainty equivalent of ex-ante expected prot Ee CEIHi .
Therefore, the rst order condition for qIFi of IH rm i is given by
@Ee CEIHi 
@qIFi
= (1  s)[a("; ")faF  QIF  QF   cF   qIFi g
 (1  )(1 + )(1  )cH ] = 0, i = 1; :::; n. (9)
The prot of foreign rm j is dened by
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Fj = (p
F   cF )qFi . (10)
From (5) and (10), the rst order condition for qFj of foreign rm j is
given by
@Fj
@qFj
= aF  QIF  QF   cF   qFj = 0, j = 1; :::;m. (11)
Summing (9) and (11) on i and j, respectively, we obtain
(1 s)afnaF (n+1)QIF nQF ncFg (1 s)n(1 )(1+)(1 )cH = 0
and
maF  mQIF   (m+ 1)QF  mcF = 0.
Solving the above two equations w.r.t. QIF and QF , we obtain
QIF =
n
m+ n+ 1
faF+(m (m+1))cF (m+1)(1 )(1+)(1 )cH=ag
(12)
and
QF =
m
m+ n+ 1
faF   (n+1 n)cF +n(1  )(1+ )(1  )cH=ag. (13)
Since qIFi and q
F
j are symmetrical in i = 1; :::; n and j = 1; :::;m, respec-
tively, from (12) and (13), we get
qIF  qIFi =
1
m+ n+ 1

aF + (m  (m+ 1))cF   (m+ 1)(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a
	
(14)
and
qF  qFj =
1
m+ n+ 1
faF   (n+1 n)cF +n(1  )(1+ )(1  )cH=ag.
(15)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (5), we obtain equilibrium prices on the
foreign market:
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pF =
1
m+ n+ 1
faF + (m+ n)cF + n(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=ag. (16)
From (14) (16) and (8), the certainty equivalent of the expected prot of
IH rm i in the foreign market at equilibrium is given by
Ee CEIHi  = (1  s)Ee CEIFi  = (1  s)fEe e"(pF   ecIF )qIFi 
 SDe e"(pF   ecIF )qIFi g
= (1  s) afpF   cFg   (1  )(1 + )(1  )cH qIFi
=
(1  s)a
m+ n+ 1
[

aF + (m  (m+ 1))cF   n(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a
	
]2
= a(1  s)
 
qIF
2
, (17)
where a = e   e; e and  stand for the standard deviation of e
and the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient, respectively. We can interpret a
as the margin compensation coe¢ cient against the exchange rate risk since
it devaluates the mean of the exchange rate between the home and foreign
countries reecting the relative risk averse of the head o¢ ce of the IH rm
from the second line in the rst term between the square brackets in (17).
We assume that
a = e   e > 0: (18)
From (3), this assumption is equivalent to
0 <  < (e
2   1) 1=2 < 1, (19)
since a = e   e = e(1  (e2   1) 1=2).
Hereafter, we assume that
(1 + )cH < ac
F . (20)
1
Note that the assumption given by inequality (20) implies the marginal
cost (or unit cost of inputs) after tax (import tari¤) of home country rms is
lower than the marginal cost (or unit cost of inputs) of foreign country rms
1If (20) does no hold, then IH rms would not want to buy intermediate inputs from
home country 1 under the exchange rate risk.
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compensated by the margin compensation coe¢ cient against the exchange
rate risk.
The ex-post expected prot of IH rm i in the home country market at
equilibrium is
Ee IHi  = (1  s)Ee IFi  = (1  s)Ee e"(pF   ecIF )qIFi 
= (1  s)Ee e"(aF  QIF  QF   (1 + )(1  )cH=e  cF )qIFi 
=
(1  s)
(m+ n+ 1)2
[(a
F + (m  (m+ 1))cF
+
(1 + )(1  )
a
cH(n(1  )  (m+ n+ 1)a)]
(aF + (m  (m+ 1))cF   (m+ 1)(1  )(1 + )(1  )
a
cH).(21)
The ex-post expected prot of rm j in the foreign country market at
equilibrium is given by
F = (pF   cF )qFj = (qFj )2. (22)
We posit a lemma before presenting results. From (2) and (3), we have
@e
@2
= (2e
2   1) exp(2+ 2) > 0 and
@2e
@2
= e(1   (2e2   1)(e2   1) 1=2)=2 R 0 () 0 <  S (e2  
1)1=2=(2e
2   1).
Furthermore, we can easily show that (e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) < (e2  
1) 1=2 < 1,
where the last inequality is from (19).
Hence, we immediately obtain the following lemma from the above.
Lemma 1
Assume that e is a log-normally distributed random variable, that is, e =
exp( eX), eX s N(; 2).
Then, we have
@e
@2
> 0, @
2e
@2
 (<) 0 if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1).
Lemma 1 asserts that when the relative risk averse coe¢ cient is small
(large), an increase of the exchange rate risk increases (decreases) the mean
and variance of the exchange rate.
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From (18) and Lemma 1, we can easily derive the next lemma without
proof.
Lemma 2
If 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1),
then @
@2
a  0 ( @@2a < 0).
From Lemma 2, an increase in exchange rate risk increases (decreases)
the margin compensation coe¢ cient against the exchange rate risk when the
relative risk averse coe¢ cient is small (large). The rm with small relative
risk for the exchange rate risk does not estimate the margin compensation as
too small, but the rm with a large relative risk estimate does so when the
exchange rate risk becomes large enough. By using this lemma, we conduct
comparative analysis of equilibrium outputs, expected prots of rms and
price on the volatility of exchange rate 2, and the rate of the stipulation on
local contents .
3 Comparative Statistics of EquilibriumOut-
come
Here, we conduct a comparative analysis on the equilibrium outcome derived
above, volatility exchange rate 2, and LCR rate . We begin with a com-
parative analysis on exchange rate volatility 2. Then, we explore the e¤ect
of the rate of the stipulation on local contents  on the equilibrium outcome.
Before presenting the results, we derive our results as follows.
From (14),(15), (16) and Lemma 2, we have
@qIF
@2
=
@qIF
@a
 @a
@2
=
(m+ 1)(1  )(1 + )(1  )
(m+ n+ 1)a2
cH  @a
@2
_ @a
@2
R 0,  S (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1), (23)
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@qF
@2
=
@qF
@a
 @a
@2
=  n(1  )(1 + )(1  )
(m+ n+ 1)a2
cH  @a
@2
_ @a
@2
S 0,  S (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1), (24)
and
@pF
@2
=
@
@a
pF  @
@2
a
=  n(1  )(1 + )(1  )
(m+ n+ 1)a2
cH  @a
@2
_   @a
@2
S 0,  S (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1). (25)
Proposition 1
Assume that aF +(m  (m+1))cF > (m+1)(1 )(1+ )(1  )cH=a],
(that is, qIF > 0). Then, we have
@
@2
qIF  0 (< 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1),
@
@2
qF  0 (> 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1), and
@
@2
pF  0 (> 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1).
Proof: From (23), we obtain the rst result.
From (24), we see the second result holds.
From (25), we obtain the third result.
When the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient is not large, if the volatility
of the exchange rate increases, then each IH rm aggressively expands its
output onto a foreign market. Therefore, QIF increases enough that the
equilibrium price decreases if foreign F rms decrease their outputs qF to
mitigate the fall in price. Hence, QF decreases, since they are strategic
substitutes in Cournot competition. As the former e¤ect surpasses that of
the latter, total equilibrium output QIF +QF increases and pF decreases.
Proposition 2
@
@2
Ee[IHi ]  0 (> 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
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((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1).
@
@2
Ee[CEIHi ]  0 (< 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1).
@
@2
Fj  0 (> 0) if and only if 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
((e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1).
Proof: From (21),we have
@
@2
Ee[IHi ] = @p
F
@2
 e(1  s)qFi + @q
F
i
@2
(1  s)e(pF   cF )  (1 + )(1  )cH
=
(1  )(1 + )(1  )
2(m+ n+ 1)a2
cH2e(1  s)f1   (2e
2   1)
(e
2   1)1=2g
[ (n  1)aF   (n  1)(m  (m+ 1))cF + (1 + )(1  )c
H
a

fn(m+ 2)(1  )  (m+ n+ 1)(1  (e2   1)1=2)g] S 0,
1   (2e
2   1)
(e
2   1)1=2 T 0 since n(m+ 2)(1  )  (m+ n+ 1)(1  (e
2   1)1=2)
< (m+ n+ 1)((e
2   1)1=2   1) < 0.
From(17), Lemma 2, and Proposition 1,
@
@2
Ee CEIHi  = @@2 (a(1  s)  qIF 2)
= (1  s)( @
@2
(a)
 
qIF
2
+ 2aq
IF @q
IF
@2
)
_ @a
@2
T 0, so the second statement of the proposition holds.
From (22) and Proposition 1, we have
@
@2
Fj = 2
@
@2
qF _ @
@2
qF T 0
and the third statement follows.
Note that the result for @
@2
Ee[IHi ] is opposite of the result for @@2Ee[CEIHi ]
in the above proposition. Therefore, the former (latter) asserts that the ex-
pected prot (certainty equivalent of the expected prot) of IH rm on the
foreign market is non-increasing (non-decreasing) in exchange rate volatility
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when the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient is not large. In words, the ex-post
expected prot reacts in quite opposite direction of the ex-ante expected
prot to the risk of the exchange rate uncertainty.
Next, we explore the e¤ect of the LCR rate  on the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3
If (e
2   1) 1=2 < (1+)cH cF
(1+)cH cF < 1, then
@qIFi
@
> 0,
@qFj
@
< 0 and @p
F
@
< 0 for 0 <  < (e
2   1) 1=2 < 1, but if (1+)cH cF
(1+)cH cF  (e
2   1) 1=2 < 1,
then @q
IF
i
@
> 0,
@qFj
@
< 0
and @p
F
@
< 0 for 0 <  < (1+)c
H cF
(1+)cH cF , but
@qIFi
@
 0, @qFj
@
 0 and @pF
@
 0 for (1+)cH cF
(1+)cH cF   < (e
2   1) 1=2 < 1.
Proof: From (14), (15), and (16), we have
@qIFi
@
=
@
@
(
1
m+ n+ 1
(aF + (m  (m+ 1))cF   (m+ 1)(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a))
=   (m+ 1)
a(m+ n+ 1)
(cFa   (1 + )(1  )cH) T 0
,  S minf(1 + )c
H   cF
(1 + )cH   cF ; (e
2   1) 1=2g, (26)
@qFj
@
=
@
@

1
m+ n+ 1
(aF   (n+ 1  n)cF + n(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a)

=
n
a
cFa   (1 + )(1  )cH
m+ n+ 1
T 0
,  T minf(1 + )c
H   cF
(1 + )cH   cF ; (e
2   1) 1=2g, (27)
and
@pF
@
=
@
@

1
m+ n+ 1
(aF + (m+ n)cF + n(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a)

=
n
a
cFa   (1 + )(1  )cH
m+ n+ 1
T 0
,  T minf(1 + )c
H   cF
(1 + )cH   cF ; (e
2   1) 1=2g, (28)
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where the equivalence in the last lines of (26), (27) and (28) follow from
(18).
However, from (20), (1 + )cH < cH < acF < c
F < c
F since  < 
from (3).
Note that ((1 + )cH   cF )=((1 + )cH   cF ) stands for the ratio of
marginal cost (or unit cost of inputs) for foreign country rms evaluated by
mean of the exchange rate, c
F , over the marginal cost after tax (tari¤) of
imported inputs from the home country, (1 + )cH to the ratio of marginal
cost (or unit cost of inputs) for foreign country rms overvalued by the stan-
dard deviation of exchange rate cF over the marginal cost after tax (tari¤)
of imported inputs from the home country, (1+)cH . Then, the above propo-
sition implies that, when this ratio ((1 + )cH   cF )=((1 + )cH   cF ) is
smaller than the upper bound of relative risk aversion coe¢ cient (e
2 1) 1=2
( see assumption1) and if  is smaller than this ratio, the measure of the rel-
ative risk aversion of IH rms is not high. As such, the increase of the LCR
proportion of the foreign government causes the aggressive expansion of the
equilibrium output of the a¢ liate rm and the defensive decreases of the one
of the foreign F rms and the equilibrium price on the foreign market, but
if  is larger than or equal to this ratio, IH rms are severely reluctant to
the exchange rate risk, and vice versa. However, if this ratio is larger than or
equal to the upper bound of relative risk aversion coe¢ cient , then the in-
crease in the LCR portion of the foreign government increases (decreases) the
equilibrium output of the a¢ liate rm (foreign rm F and equilibrium price)
for any  lower than the upper bound of relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
(e
2   1) 1=2.
4 If Number of IH Firms is Endogenous
Here, we explore the e¤ects of foreign exchange rate volatility and the change
in the proportion of LCR on the equilibrium outcomes for when the number
of IH rms, n, is endogenously determined by the free entry and exit of home
country rms onto the foreign market.
We denote by F > 0 the entry cost of the IH rm of the home country
on the foreign market by incorporating its subsidiary companies. The free
entry and exit condition onto the foreign market is given as follows:
Ee CEIHi  = a(1  s)  qIF 2 = F . (29)
From (14), the above equation can be rewritten as
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(1  s)a
(m+ n+ 1)2
(aF+(m (m+1))cF (m+1)(1 )(1+)(1 )cH=a)2 = F .
Solving this equation with respect to n, we obtain
n =
r
a(1  s)
F
(aF+(m (m+1))cF (m+1)(1 )(1+)(1 )cH=a) (m+1).
@n
@
= (m+ 1)((1  )(1 + )cH=a   cF ) T 0, 1  acF=((1 + )cH) T .
However, because 1 acF=((1+)cH) < 0, from (20) and 0 < (1+) < 1,
@n
@
= (m+ 1)((1  )(1 + )cH=a   cF ) < 0
, 1  acF=((1 + )cH) < 0 <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1.
From Lemma 2,
@n
@2
=
@n
@a
 @a
@2
=
1
2
s
(1  s)
Fa
(aF + (m  (m+ 1))cF + (m+ 1)(1  )(1 + )(1  )cH=a)  @a
@2
T 0, @
@2
a T 0,  T (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1).
Therefore, we present the following proposition without proof.
Proposition 4
@n
@
< 0 for any 0 <  < (e
2   1) 1=2 < 1.
If 0 <   (e2   1)1=2=(2e2   1)
( (e
2   1)1=2=(2e2   1) <  < (e2   1) 1=2 < 1),
then @n

@2
 0 ( @n
@2
< 0).
The above proposition asserts that tightening the LCR of the foreign
government always accelerates the exit of a¢ liate IF rms from the foreign
market and if the extent of the relative risk aversion of international IH rms
is not high, the entry of a¢ liate IF rms onto the foreign market can become
urged as the exchange rate risk increases.
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5 Conclusion
We considered an international oligopoly model with the oligopolistic market
in a foreign country. The international home rms ( IH rms) compete on a
host foreign country (country 2) oligopolistic market through their a¢ liates
by FDI. Assume the government of country 2 imposes LCR on IH rms
(or their a¢ liates) for at least a  (0 <  < 1) proportion of total inputs.
Furthermore, we assume IH rm i (its a¢ liate rm) internally reserves its
prot at foreign market equilibrium for the ratio of s (0 < s < 1) and remits
its prot for the ratio of 1  s from the foreign market to the head o¢ ce in
the home country. We derived a Cournot equilibrium under foreign exchange
rate uncertainty for when the number of IH rms, n, is either exogenous or
endogenous. Then, we explored the e¤ects of foreign exchange rate volatility
and change of the rate of LCR on equilibrium outcomes.
In the equilibrium for the former case, we show that if the measure of the
relative risk aversion of IH rms is not high, a¢ liate rms IF aggressively
expand their outputs, while the foreign F rms defensively decrease their
outputs and the equilibrium price on the foreign market. However, if 
is larger than or equal to a certain threshold ratio IH rms are severely
reluctant to the exchange rate risk, and vice versa. Further, the ex-post
expected prots of the a¢ liate rms decrease, but their ex-ante certainty
equivalent of expected prots increases with the volatility of the exchange
rate when the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient is not high at equilibrium.
In the latter case, tightening of the LCR from the foreign government
always accelerates the exit of a¢ liate IF rms from the foreign market and,
if the extent of the relative risk aversion of international IH rms is not high,
the entry of a¢ liate IF rms onto the foreign market can be urged, as the
exchange rate risk increases.
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